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If Congress does not act, the U.S. federal budget deficit 
could easily exceed $200 billion in each of the three fiscal 
years 1983-85.
1 This budget hemorrhage would come on 
top of deficits averaging $76.5 billion per year over the last 
three fiscal years and would make sixteen straight years the 
budget has been in the red. Deficits have been persistent 
and have been getting larger. 
The divergence of the government's expenditures and 
revenues perhaps has been no larger than the divergence of 
economists' views on that policy's likely economic effects. 
And nowhere has the divergence of views seemed wider 
than on its inflationary effects. 
Many economists argue that persistently higher deficits 
do not necessarily lead to higher inflation. (See, for exam-
ple, Blinder 1982, Friedman 1981a, Grossman 1982, Ham-
burger and Zwick 1981, Hein 1981, Sprinkel 1981, and 
Weintraub 1981.) They argue that inflation results when 
the supply of money grows faster than the supply of goods, 
which in turn results when the Federal Reserve purchases 
too many government bonds. These economists (whom I 
label monetarists) thus conclude that the Federal Reserve 
can prevent higher deficits from causing more inflation by 
refusing to buy the extra government bonds that result from 
those deficits (that is, by refusing to monetize the deficits). 
As support for this view that higher deficits are not neces-
sarily inflationary, monetarists cite numerous empirical 
studies which indicate weak, if any, correlation between 
deficits and inflation in the United States. 
In this paper, I take the opposing view: Persistently 
higher deficits—changes in budget policy that for any given 
economic conditions imply higher deficits than would have 
occurred under previous budget policy—do indeed lead to 
more inflation. A theory which admits the possibility of 
such policy changes suggests that the changes affect infla-
tion in three ways. 
One way is by necessary monetary accommodation. 
Contrary to what monetarists believe, the Federal Reserve 
may have to monetize some of the extra debt; that may be 
the only way to prevent the government from becoming 
insolvent. 
Even to the extent that the Federal Reserve does not 
monetize the debt, however, adjustments in the private 
economy to the higher deficit policy lead to more inflation, 
in two other ways: by crowding out and by private moneti-
zation of debt. When additional government debt is not 
monetized by the Federal Reserve, the debt adds to net 
credit demands and raises interest rates. Higher interest 
rates crowd out investment in plant and equipment, which 
reduces the rate of real growth in the economy. With the 
same amount of money chasing fewer goods, prices are 
driven up. In the financial sector, meanwhile, higher inter-
est rates make profitable the development of new financial 
instruments that make government bonds more like money. 
These instruments allow people to hold interest-bearing 
*This is a substantially revised version of a paper presented at The Eco-
nomic Consequences of Government Deficits: An Economic Policy Confer-
ence, cosponsored by the Center for the Study of American Business and the 
Institute of Banking and Financial Markets and held at Washington University, 
St. Louis, Missouri, in October 1982. That paper is forthcoming in a volume of 
the conference proceedings. 
1The Congressional Budget Office's (CBO's) baseline budget projections 
forfiscal years 1983-85, which are based on assumptions of no change in current 
laws and no change in real discretionary spending, are $194 billion, 
$197 billion, and $214 billion, respectively. These large baseline deficits are 
based on the CBO's assumption of a weak economic recovery. However, even 
assuming a strong economic recovery over the next three years, the CBO 
estimates that deficits would still be $178 billion, $155 billion, and $162 billion, 
respectively. (See U.S., Congress, CBO 1983). 
8 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Winter 1983 
assets that are as risk-free and as useful in transactions as 
money is. In this way, the private sector effectively mone-
tizes government debt that the Federal Reserve doesn't, so 
the inflationary effects of higher deficit policies increase. 
Despite monetarists' claims, this view that higher deficit 
policies lead to higher inflation is supported by empirical 
work. Studies properly designed to capture the effects of 
budget policy changes show that both U.S. and interna-
tional experiences are consistent with this view: a change in 
budget policy which results in higher deficits year-in and 
year-out leads to higher average inflation. Studies that do 
not support this view mistakenly relate isolated deficits and 
inflation rates instead of properly relating deficit policies 
and average inflation experience. 
How Governments Can Run Persistent Deficits 
A budget deficit occurs when spending exceeds taxes, user 
fees, and other explicit revenues. The simplest form of a 
higher deficit policy—a permanent increase in deficits—re-
quires that spending permanently exceed revenues, but this 
would seem to violate the simple accounting constraint that 
what goes out must not exceed what comes in. That it 
doesn't is due to the existence of fiat debt, those govern-
ment liabilities for which there are no offsetting assets. 
When fiat debt has value in an economy, the government 
can finance permanently higher deficits by implicitly taxing 
(depreciating the value of) its outstanding stock of that 
debt. 
The Budget Constraint 
The concepts of deficit policies, fiat debt, and implicit 
taxation and the proposition that higher deficit policies lead 
to higher inflation can be explained more precisely by 
referring to a formal representation (in equation form) of 
the limits faced by a federal government and a central bank 
(like the Federal Reserve) trying to finance a budget deficit. 
I will derive the consolidated federal government-central 
bank budget constraint assuming that the government bor-
rows by selling fiat bonds which are discounts issued for 
one period. The government sells the bonds in an open 
market at a price below their face value (par) and retires all 
outstanding privately held bonds at par. The difference 
between par and market price (the discount) represents 
interest. The bonds which are not purchased by the private 
sector are purchased by the central bank by creating money: 
currency and bank reserves. Because the money is backed 
only by fiat bonds, it too is a form of fiat debt. 
First I will derive separate period-by-period budget con-
straints for the federal government and the central bank and 
consolidate them. Then I will generate the consolidated 
budget constraint that must hold over time when the econ-
omy grows at a constant rate (so-called steady-state 
growth). This last step provides a shorthand way of examin-
ing long-run relationships.
2 
In current-dollar terms, the federal government's period-
by-period budget constraint states that each period it must 
raise enough revenue from new bond sales to finance both 
debt service—the principal and interest payments on its 
privately held debt—and the deficit net of debt service. In 
algebraic form, the constraint says 
Deficit = Net bond sales 
where 
Net bond sales = Total sales of new bonds 
— Principal and interest payments 
to retire bonds previously sold to 
the private sector. 
Introducing symbols that distinguish prices and quantities 
lets me write this constraint as 
(1) P(G -T) =P
BB* 
where 
P = general price level 
G = real government expenditures 
(net of debt service) 
T = real government tax receipts 
G — T = real government deficit 
P(G — T) = current-dollar government deficit 
B * = total stock of government bonds sold in 
the current period 
B i = stock of privately held government 
bonds sold in the previous period 
P
B = price of government bonds when issued, 
defined to be 1/(1 + R), where R is the 
nominal one-period interest rate. 
2 In general, a persistent deficit policy is feasible when the present value of 
real government expenditures does not exceed the present value of real govern-
ment revenues defined to include both explicit and implicit taxes. The steady-
state assumptions provide a way of looking at these present-value relationships 
for a smoothly growing economy. 
9 According to (1), the federal government sellsfi* bonds 
on the open market but retires only its bonds purchased by 
the private sectorThe difference between total bonds 
sold and bonds sold to the private sector consists of bonds 
sold to the central bank. Again, the central bank pays for its 
bond purchases by creating money which ends up in the 
private sector. Because the central bank simply accumu-
lates bonds in its portfolio rather than presenting the matur-
ing bonds for payment, the central bank's period-by-period 
budget constraint is simply 
Central bank bond purchases = Money created 
or, in the symbolic notation just introduced, 
(2) P
B(B* — B) = M — M-\ 
where 
M = stock of money 
P
B(B* — B) = value of bonds purchased by the 
central bank (total less value 
purchased by the private sector) 
M — M-x = increase in the money stock. 
The consolidated federal government-central bank 
period-by-period budget constraint is found by combining 
the two institutions' budget constraints to get 
Deficit = Money created + Net private bond sales 
or 
(3) P(G — T) = (M - M-1) + (P
BB - £_!). 
This constraint states that the government's current-dollar 
deficit is financed by the increase in values of its money and 
bonds held in the private sector. 
To examine how the federal government can finance a 
permanent deficit, we cannot just look at the period-by-
period budget constraint. Instead we must examine all 
current and future deficits and their means of finance to 
determine if the government will be able to finance the 
permanent deficits without ever becoming insolvent. For 
my purposes, which abstract from the cyclical fluctuations 
of the economy and focus on the effects of persistent or 
permanent shifts in budget policy, it is enough to consider a 
representative fiscal period in an economy growing 
smoothly over time, a steady-state economy, and derive the 
consolidated budget constraint assuming perfectly smooth, 
or constant, growth in real output. 
To derive this constraint from the period-by-period ver-
sion, I first divide all terms in (3) by PX, whereX is the rate 
of real output. Then I impose the steady-state real growth 
conditions—that for all time periods 
GTIXT  = G  Real government 
expenditures are a constant 
proportion of real output. 
TJXT -= T  Real government tax receipts 
are a constant proportion of 
real output. 
XJXT- ! = 1 + V  Real output grows at the 
constant rate v. 
PJP<- ! = i + n  Prices grow at the constant 
rate 11. 
P
B =  1/(1 + R)  The nominal interest rate is 
constant. 
M/PX  = M
D(R,U)  The real, per unit of output, 
money stock each period is 
equal to its demand, the latter 
being a time invariant 
function of the interest rate 
and inflation rate. 
P
BB/PX = B
CI(R,U). The real, per unit of output, 
value of privately held 
government bonds each 
period is equal to its demand, 
the latter being a time 
invariant function of the 
interest rate and inflation 
rate. 
Making these substitutions in (3) divided by PX yields, 
finally, the consolidated federal government-central bank 
steady-state budget constraint for a representative fiscal 
period: 
(4) G - f={ 1 - [1/(1 + n)(l + v)]}M\R,n) 
+ {l - [(1 +/?)/(1 + n)(l + V)]}B
D(R,U). 
The budget constraint in this form demonstrates the 
importance of fiat debt to a government that wants to 
persistently run deficits. According to (4), a persistent 
deficit policy (G —T> 0) is feasible if the real deficit does 
10 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Winter 1983 
not exceed the real revenue the government can extract 
from its money and bond issue (that is, from depreciating 
the value of its fiat debt). The terms in braces determine the 
government's tax take from money and bond issue. The tax 
bases for the two taxes are real private holdings of money 
and bonds, M/P and P
BB/P, respectively. The tax bases 
both grow smoothly at the rate v. With no growth in the tax 
base, v = 0, the terms in the braces can be considered the 
implicit tax rates on real money and real bond holdings. 
Some insights are gained about those tax rates by setting 
v = 0 and applying a little algebra. The implicit tax rate on 
money, {1 — [1/(1 + II)]}, is positive as long as the rate of 
inflation is positive (II > 0). The implicit tax rate on bonds, 
{1 - [(1 + R)/( 1 + II)]}, is positive as long as the real rate 
of interest is negative (R — II < 0). Money and bond issue 
provide the government with positive tax takes as long as 
the terms in braces are positive, and that requires for each 
that the sum of the implicit tax rate and the growth in the tax 
base is positive.
3 Only when the demands for fiat money 
and bonds and the implicit tax takes on them are positive 
can a permanent deficit be financed. 
Clarifications 
The proposition that higher deficit policies lead to higher 
inflation can be stated more precisely now as "a permanent 
increase in G — f requires an increase in II in order for 
budget constraint (4) to be satisfied." In order to properly 
interpret' 'a permanent increase in G — 7" when testing the 
proposition with actual data, it is helpful to recall the 
definitions and assumptions used in the construction of (4). 
Two points are worth emphasizing. 
One is that a sustained increase in G — T must be 
interpreted as a policy-induced increase in the deficit, that 
is, as a change in expenditure programs or tax rates which 
raises the deficit permanently for a given path of the econ-
omy. It does not refer to an increase in deficits caused by a 
cyclical downturn in the economy. Cyclical deficits are by 
definition temporary; they diminish as the economy recov-
ers. To be consistent with this interpretation, the budget 
constraint (4) is derived under the assumption of steady real 
growth, not cycles of ups and downs. 
This distinction between policy-induced and cyclical 
deficits is crucial because my argument does not claim that 
cyclical deficits are inflationary. An increase in the reported 
deficit could well be associated with lower inflation when 
both changes are caused by a weakening in economic 
conditions. Thus, the measure G —T that I am considering 
is not the reported deficit, relative to reported real GNP, but 
is instead the real deficit net of debt service which would 
occur assuming trend real GNP, relative to trend real GNP. 
The other point worth emphasizing is that a sustained 
increase in G — t must be interpreted as a policy change for 
a government that can issue fiat debt, debt not backed by 
anything. If debt issued today were assumed to be backed, 
for example, by higher explicit taxes in the future, then an 
increase in G — f could not be sustained overtime; a higher 
G —T today would imply a lowerG — f in the future. Nor 
can the debt be backed by real goods. If the government 
issued bonds to purchase capital goods, its period-by-
period budget constraint would be different from (1). Since 
the government then could always sell its capital to finance 
expenditures, the change in the current value of its capital 
stock would have to be included in (1). Or, if money were 
backed by a commodity like gold, the central bank's 
period-by-period budget constraint would be different from 
(2). The central bank could not always issue money to buy 
unbacked government bonds; its money issue would be 
constrained by its holdings of gold, and the value of gold 
would show up in its budget constraint. The consolidated 
federal government-central bank budget constraints (3) and 
(4), then, are based on the assumption that the consolidated 
balance sheet has privately held money and bonds on the 
liability side but no capital goods on the asset side, which 
makes both money and bonds forms of fiat debt. 
Why Higher Deficit Policies Increase Inflation 
While the government's budget constraint is useful in 
showing how a permanent deficit might be financed and in 
clarifying what is meant by "higher deficit policies lead to 
higher inflation," it cannot determine whether that proposi-
tion is true. In order to determine whether a higher deficit 
policy can, in fact, be financed and, if it can, whether it will 
lead to higher inflation, a theory of the economy and mone-
tary system is required. 
The Legal Restrictions Theory 
When the government issues fiat debt, budget policy deter-
mines the total amount of debt [by (1)], while monetary 
policy determines its distribution between fiat money and 
fiat bonds [by (2)]. The supplies of these assets together 
with the aggregate demands M
D and B
D determine the rate 
of inflation II and the nominal interest rate R. In order 
3 The condition for money is n + v > 0, or simply n > —v. The condition for 
bonds is n - R + v > 0, or simply R — n < v. Both of these conditions for 
positive taxes are approximations found by setting Uv = 0. The approximations 
would be exact in continuous time. 
11 to determine the relative roles of monetary and budget 
policies in affecting inflation and interest rates, however, 
we need a theory of the economy and monetary system 
to describe the nature of M
d and/K 
The budget constraint indicates that at least one of the 
demands M
d or B
d must be positive if higher deficits are to 
be feasible. So the theory of the demands for money and 
government bonds should include an explanation of why 
people would value either of them. Valued fiat debt is by no 
means assured. When private markets exist for making all 
possible types of trades (when markets are complete), fiat 
money and bonds are of no use either as goods (they are not 
physically consumed or used in production) or as assets 
(they do not expand the trades that can be made), and the 
private sector has no demand for them. Or, in an unre-
stricted economy, when assets exist which have rates of 
return in all states of the economy that exceed the rates of 
return on fiat debt, the demands for fiat debt will be zero. In 
these cases, according to (4), persistent deficit policies 
simply cannot be financed. 
Although positive demands for fiat debt are not assured, 
governments can enact laws and regulations to assure them. 
And they do. In the United States, for example, fiat debt has 
value in part because of such government rules as legal 
tender laws and reserve requirements. These laws and regu-
lations force individuals and depository institutions to de-
mand government fiat debt even when it is being taxed, and 
this allows persistent deficits to be financed. 
The laws and regulations a government enacts not only 
assure the demands for its fiat debt; they also separate the 
demands for money and bonds. U.S. depository institu-
tions, for instance, are not only required to hold in reserve a 
proportion of their deposits in the form of fiat debt (which 
increases the total demand for such debt). That fiat debt is 
further specified to be in the form of money, not bonds 
(which separates the demands for money and bonds). Insti-
tutions also are prevented by law from issuing bearer notes 
backed by government bonds (which, along with the large 
denominations of bonds, also separates the demands for 
money and bonds).
4 
Without laws and regulations, if fiat money and bonds 
were held at all, they would become perfect substitutes; the 
distinction between them would disappear (Wallace 1979). 
To see why that is so, suppose that money and bonds were 
issued in the same denominations and that the government 
in no way restricted or regulated the use of either instru-
ment. Both assets would then be held only if they paid the 
same rate of return. If an ^-period bond paid a positive 
interest rate while money didn't, for instance, a trader could 
profit by breaking the bond into n one-period bonds, each 
paying a positive rate of return. Everyone would then prefer 
one-period bonds to money, and no one would hold money. 
Thus, without legal restrictions, the demand for fiat debt 
could fall to zero, and if it didn't, bonds and money would 
become perfect substitutes, leaving the government with 
only one implicit tax rate. 
If money and bonds were perfect substitutes, deficits 
would be directly inflationary, and monetary policy would 
be irrelevant. That is because budget policy would deter-
mine the growth of total fiat debt, while monetary policy 
would determine the distribution of fiat debt between two 
perfect substitutes. So without the laws and regulations that 
enhance and separate the demands for fiat debt, the govern-
ment would have an unassured base for its implicit taxes-
one or both of the types of debt might not be demanded— 
and its steady-state implicit tax rates on money and bonds 
would be equal. 
A purpose behind these laws and regulations, then, may 
be to allow the government to raise its implicit taxes more 
efficiently. By increasing the demands for fiat debt, they 
increase the tax base for implicit taxes and so allow a given 
amount of revenue to be raised at lower implicit tax rates. 
By assuring two distinct debt instruments yielding different 
returns, they allow the government to tax-discriminate in 
financing deficits.
5 [This occurs whenever nominal interest 
rates on government bonds are positive, for then, according 
to (4), the implicit tax rate on money is higher than the 
implicit tax rate on bonds.] 
Three Channels for Inflation 
This legal restrictions theory of fiat money and fiat bonds 
can generate a model which has some properties common 
to monetarist models which deny the influence of deficits 
on inflation: money growth as the immediate cause of 
inflation, a one-for-one relationship between changes in 
inflation and changes in nominal interest rates, and expan-
siveness of open market purchases (Miller 1982a,b). These 
properties result when the restrictions cause money to cir-
4 For a discussion of how this last restriction works, see Neil Wallace's 
paper, "A Legal Restrictions Theory of the Demand for' Money' and the Role of 
Monetary Policy," in this Quarterly Review. 
5 It might also be argued that restrictions having the effect of separating 
demands for money and bonds were imposed so that the government could 
control the stock of money to pursue a price stabilization goal and control the 
stock of bonds to smooth tax rates over time. This tax discrimination rationale 
for legal restrictions was first worked out in Bryant and Wallace 1980 and was 
employed in Miller 1982a,b,c. 
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culate as a medium of exchange, while bonds compete with 
capital as a store of value. However, when the separation of 
demands for money and bonds is due to government restric-
tions, higher deficits lead to more inflation, in three ways: 
monetary accommodation, crowding out, and private mon-
etization of government debt.
6 
Monetarists commonly acknowledge that higher deficits 
lead to more inflation when the Federal Reserve accommo-
dates by monetizing the deficits. But these economists tend 
to view the Fed's accommodation either as a lack of resolve 
or as shortsightedness (Friedman 1981a, Hein 1981, Wein-
traub 1981). This view implies that more inflation is avoid-
able if the Fed acts responsibly. The restrictions theory, 
however, suggests that the Fed may have little choice. 
A key implication of the theory of financial restrictions 
is that federal budget and monetary policies must be coordi-
nated (Sargent and Wallace 1981; Miller 1982a,b). In fact, 
if deficits are financed efficiently (that is, with minimal 
distortion of private sector incentives and behavior), it is not 
feasible to finance larger deficits—even temporary ones— 
by bond issue alone (Miller 1982c). Larger deficits require 
accommodation by the monetary authority; if it is not 
forthcoming, the increase in bonds will cause real interest 
payments on bonds to grow without limit, thereby forcing 
the government into insolvency. Central bank monetization 
of deficits—and more inflation—is, then, necessary at some 
point to prevent the insolvency.
7 
The need to monetize deficits in order to prevent insol-
vency can be viewed another way. If the central bank 
ignores budget policy and sticks to a predetermined path of 
money—say, a no-growth path—then the federal govern-
ment is denied the option of creating money to finance 
deficits. Additional bond issue becomes like that of state 
and local governments: it must be backed by higherrevenue 
in the future. Trying to service the bonds by issuing new 
bonds only causes the interest on the debt and, thus, total 
debt to snowball. 
Crowding out is another way that, under the legal restric-
tions theory, higher deficits lead to more inflation. Different 
degrees of monetary accommodation are feasible for a 
given increase in deficits. Less monetary accommodation 
requires more bonds to be sold on the open market to 
private investors, and in general this drives more private 
capital out of the market. That is because bonds compete 
with private capital in individual portfolios. When there are 
decreasing returns to capital, the substitution of govern-
ment current expenditures for private capital expenditures 
raises the real rate of interest and lowers the path of real 
output (Friedman 1981b, Miller 1982c). A given money 
path combined with a lower output path produces a higher 
price path. 
Finally, the legal restrictions theory implies that higher 
deficits lead to more inflation by encouraging the private 
sector to circumvent the restrictions on bonds and so, in 
effect, to privately monetize government debt. A plausible 
explanation of how this happens is the following. Suppose 
the legal restrictions can be circumvented by private inter-
mediaries in successive steps only at successively higher 
costs. The profit from finding ways around the restrictions 
is the difference between those increasing costs and the 
revenue that can be earned by substituting bond holdings 
for money holdings. This profit, then, is related directly to 
the difference in returns on bonds and money: the nominal 
interest rate. 
When a policy of higher deficits raises interest rates, 
therefore, the private sector responds by pursuing more 
ways to circumvent the restrictions on substituting bonds 
for money. Private intermediaries find it profitable, for 
example, to develop financial instruments backed by gov-
ernment bonds, which the private sector can use in lieu of 
money and which earn interest at something less than the 
government bond rate. As a result, bonds become easier to 
use for spending, and that implies more inflation for given 
deficits and money growth. In terms of the budget con-
straint, as the private sector finds ways to shift its fiat debt 
holdings from highly taxed money to less highly taxed 
bonds, total implicit taxes fall. For a given increase in 
deficits, the government can only offset these losses if 
inflation increases and so raises the implicit tax rates on 
money and bonds. 
Casual observation suggests that this third way higher 
6Strictly speaking, more inflation will result through these channels pro-
vided the private sector's demands forfiat money and bonds do not increase. It is 
assumed in what follows that the government does not raise these demands by 
tightening restrictions (for example, by raising reserve requirements). It seems 
reasonable that, if an increase in implicit taxes on fiat debt were required, the 
increase could be levied by some combination of tighter regulations (an increase 
in the base) and higher inflation (an increase in the tax rate). 
Under a transaction cost theory of separate demands for money and bonds, 
higher deficits do not lead to higher inflation through monetary accommodation 
or crowding out. According to this theory, private monetization causes bonds to 
be almost perfect substitutes for money, so deficits are directly inflationary. (See 
Bryant and Wallace 1979.) 
7 Deficits also can be so large that insolvency will not be avoided even with 
monetary accommodation. Higher inflation drives the implicit tax rates on fiat 
debt toward one (as the budget constraint makes clear) but lowers the demand for 
fiat debt. Hence, the implicit taxes that can be raised through monetary accom-
modation and its resulting inflation are bounded. 
13 deficits lead to inflation under the legal restrictions theory is 
more than a theoretical possibility. In recent years in the 
United States there have developed, at money market mu-
tual funds, demand deposit accounts that are backed by 
Treasury securities and, at banks, deep-discount insured 
certificates of deposit that are backed by Treasury securi-
ties, issued in denominations of as little as $250, and 
assured of purchase by a broker (Sloane 1982). In Brazil, 
which has run high deficits for years, Treasury bills have 
become very liquid: their average turnover is now less than 
two days. 
What Has Actually Happened 
Despite many claims to the contrary, evidence does suggest 
that higher inflation results from higher deficit policies. 
Both U.S. and international experiences suggest it. The 
reason that many studies fail to detect any relationship is 
that they fail to distinguish between deficit policies and 
deficit realizations. 
Proper and Improper Tests 
In order to clarify the statistical issue, I posit a simple time 
series model to serve as a frame of reference. The model is 
motivated by the theory described in the previous section 
and can be easily generalized to allow, for example, longer 
lags. The main difference between this and the earlier 
discussion is that here I do not construct the model for the 
steady state. Its long-run properties thus are not immedi-
ately apparent but instead must be derived. 
The state of the economy at time t is described by the rate 
of real output Xt, the aggregate price level Pt, and the 
nominal interest rate on one-period bonds R,. Policy instru-
ments include total unbacked federal debt Z?,* and un-
backed money—the value of purchased by the monetary 
authority—Mt. B udget policy (5) and monetary policy (6) are 
rules for determining current values of those instruments as 
linear functions (feedback rules) of the state of the economy 
and the policy instruments in the previous period: 
(5) S* = a, + bxt + cnXt.! + cl2Pt-i + cI3*f-i 
+ dnB*x +dnMt-i + €U 
(6) Mt = a2 + b2t + c21X,_! 4- c22Pt.x
 4- c23Rt-i 
4- d2\BfL i + d22Mt-\ + e* 
where thefl's,&'s,c's, and d"s are coefficients and the e's 
are serially uncorrected random disturbances. Policies are 
thus associated with numerical values of the coefficients in 
these feedback rules. The debt level Bf and the money 
supply M, that actually occur in any period depend on the 
policy rules, the state of the economy and the policy instru-
ments in the previous period, and the random disturbances. 
The economic process describes how the current state of 
the economy is determined by its own past values and the 
past and previously expected current values of the policy 
instruments: 
(7) =/i 4- glt 4- hnXt-x + hl2Pt.i 4- hl3Rt., 
+ /,,£*, +/12M,_, +jnEtB* 
+ jl2E,Mt + filt 
(8) Pt =f2 + g2t + h2lXt.x + h22Pt-X + h23Rt.! 
+ i2lB*{ + i22Mt-i +j2iEtB* 
4- j22 EtMt 4- n2t 
(9) Rr =f3 + g3t + h3lXt. l + h32Pt-1 + h33Rt.x 
+ i3lB*-x + i32Mt-i +jzlEtB* 
+ j32EtMt + n3l 
where the/'s,g's,/z's,/'s, and/s are coefficients; the /x's 
are serially uncorrected random disturbances; and EtB 
and E,Mt are people's expectations of the current levels of 
debt and money, respectively, conditional on known values 
of the state of the economy and the policy instruments at 
time t — 1. The j coefficients play the important role of 
representing how the current state of the economy is af-
fected by people's expectations of policy instrument val-
ues. I assume that those expectations are rational, that is, 
consistent with the forecasts that would be generated by the 
model—here, the policy rules (5) and (6). 
Because the expectations terms cannot be directly ob-
served, the coefficients of the economic process (7)-(9) 
cannot be statistically estimated. Replacing the unobserved 
expectations with the objective forecasts based on the pol-
icy rules (5) and (6) produces an estimable system with 
each equation analogous to the following one for the price 
level: 
(10) P, = a + ^ + yA., + y2Pt+ y3Rt., 
+ 8A* ! + 82Af,_! + /Z2, 
where 
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a  = fl +72101 +722^2 




72  = h22 +721^12 +722^22 
73 
= ^23 + 721
C13 + 7*22^23 
Si  = ill +721^11 +722^21 
82 
= in + ji\d\i + jnd22. 
The coefficients of the estimable system, of which (10) is 
an example, are combinations of the coefficients of policies 
(5) and (6) and coefficients of the economic process (7), 
(8), and (9). The coefficients of the policies—the a's, Z?'s, 
c's, and d"s—appear in the estimable system because of the 
assumptions that the current state of the economy depends 
on people's expectations of policy (not all the/s are zero) 
and that those expectations incorporate information about 
the policies actually in place. 
The empirical counterpart of the proposition that higher 
deficit policies lead to higher inflation now can be restated 
in terms of (5) and (10) as "an increase in ax or bx— a 
constant or growing increase in deficits—leads to an in-
crease in a or (3—a constant or growing increase in the price 
level/V'
8 If the model (5)-(9) is correct, the proposition is 
true when people's expectations of deficits incorporate 
information about the actual policy rule (5) (expectations 
are rational) and when those expectations are positively 
related to inflation (j2i > 0). Since economists who argue 
that deficits are not inflationary generally accept the ra-
tional expectations assumption, the controversial part of the 
proposition is the required relationship between expecta-
tions and inflation, that j2l > 0. 
In order to determine whether or not j2\ is positive, it is 
necessary to empirically estimate the coefficients of a sys-
tem of equations which includes at least (5) and (10). A 
shift in budget policy (5) must be detected, and estimates of 
the coefficients of (10) must be made before and after the 
policy shift. In order to have reliable estimates, there should 
be many such policy shifts. 
Examining studies which find no inflationary effects of 
deficit policies in the context of system (5)-(10) reveals 
why those studies are flawed. They attempt to estimate the 
coefficient on deficits in a price equation [Sx in (10)] and 
test the proposition that higher deficits increase inflation by 
examining whether that coefficient is significantly positive. 
(See, for example, Blinder 1982, Hein 1981, Perry 1978, 
Stein 1976, and Weintraub 1981.) In order for this estima-
tion technique to be valid, the relationship of prices to the 
other variables must not change over the period of estima-
tion, but according to the model (5)-(9), that assumption is 
valid only if the deficit policy (5) doesn't change. 
Thus, studies done in the standard way offer little evi-
dence about whether higher deficit policies lead to higher 
inflation. If the assumptions underlying their estimation 
technique are valid, then deficit policy did not change 
during the estimation period and these studies can offer no 
evidence about the effects of such a change. They at best 
can detect the relationship between deficit realizations and 
inflation under a given policy (80, and as my model (5)-(9) 
suggests, this relationship can be of any sign or magnitude. 
In more intuitive terms, the standard studies pick up how 
deficits and inflation were related over the business cycle 
under a given policy, and that relationship can be anything. 
However, if policy did change during the estimation pe-
riod, then the assumptions underlying the estimation tech-
nique in standard studies are violated and their estimates are 
not valid. The coefficients in (10) cannot be expected to 
remain invariant under different policies. 
Evidence From Studies of Deficit Policy Changes 
Persuasive evidence that higher deficit policies lead to more 
inflation comes from studies of dramatic budget policy 
changes in countries around the world. For example, 
Sargent's (1981) study strongly suggests that the European 
hyperinflations of the 1920s were fueled by policies of high 
deficits and unbacked debt and were abruptly halted when 
policies of balanced budgets and backed debt were rein-
stated. Harberger (1982) and McKinnon (1982), in their 
separate studies of Chile and of Argentina and Chile, re-
spectively, document the pivotal role played by budget 
policies in determining those countries' inflation outcomes. 
Patinkin (1979) describes a similar experience for Israel. 
The evidence for the modern U.S. economy cannot be as 
strong. This is because, in post-World War II history 
through 1981, there seems to have been only one major shift 
in federal budget policy—a shift in the late 1960s from 
nearly balanced budgets to persistent deficits—and that shift 
8An increase in A\ OT'OI implies an increase in deficits forgiven economic 
conditions, the type of increase considered in the previous sections. In a strict 
sense, an increase in a\ or b\ implies, respectively, a constant or growing 
increase in deficits only when dw = 1. A change in any of the c's need not 
change the average size of deficits; it might only change the responsiveness of 
deficits to changes in economic conditions. 
15 does not seem to have been large compared to the examples 
cited above. To determine whether that apparent shift to a 
policy of higher deficits was statistically significant and to 
examine the shift's impact on inflation, I estimate over the 
period 1948-81 a vector autoregressive model (VAR) [a 
version of (5), (6), and equations like (10)], test for a 
significant change in budget policy (5), and estimate sepa-
rate models for the period before and the period after the 
change (Miller 1982d). 
Because there is only one shift in U.S. budget policy to 
examine, a finding of higher inflation in the period of higher 
deficits would be very weak evidence for the proposition: 
many other changes (besides policy changes) in the two 
periods could account for inflation being higher when defi-
cits were. So, in an attempt to judge the proposition more 
conclusively, I also test some other implications of the legal 
restrictions theory which generates the proposition. The 
theory suggests that, in the period of higher deficits, along 
with inflation being higher, fiat bonds should be more like 
fiat money and less fiat money should be held for any given 
level of GNP. If the legal restrictions theory is correct, 
Chart 1 
Along with a higher deficit policy 
came higher inflation. 
Average Annual Rates of Growth in Federal Debt 







Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 
bonds become more like money as people develop ways to 
circumvent the restrictions separating the demands for 
money and bonds, and less fiat money is held for a given 
level of GNP (its velocity, GNP/M, rises) as fiat bonds take 
on some functions formerly served by money. If these other 
implications are supported by the U.S. data, then that 
corroborates, and strengthens, any direct evidence support-
ing the proposition. 
The VARs I examine contain five quarterly time series: 
a measure of real output, real GNP (RGNP); a measure of 
the price level, the GNP deflator (GNPD); a representative 
market interest rate, the 90-day Treasury bill rate (RTB); a 
measure of fiat money, total bank reserves (TR); and a 
measure of total fiat debt, federal debt (DEBT). The mea-
sure of fiat money is the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank's 
"total reserves" series, adjusted for seasonal factors and 
changes in reserve requirements. It is intended as a measure 
of the unbacked money that the private sector would have 
held if there had been no changes in financial restrictions. 
The measure of fiat debt is constructed by adding the 
accumulated, quarterly national income account deficit 
(not annualized) to the total public debt net of government 
account holdings in 1948. In the VARs, all series except the 
bill rate are logged. 
This limited set of variables is intended to be the small-
est system able to capture major channels of policy influ-
ence: monetary and budget policies together determine the 
inflation rate and the interest rate, which in turn affect real 
output by their impact on the rate of investment. Monetary 
policies and budget policies are represented as rules which 
determine the current levels of bank reserves and federal 
debt, respectively, as functions of lagged values of all the 
variables in the system. 
Each variable in the system is regressed on a constant 
and on m lags of all five variables. Thus, the system can be 
written as 
(ii) r, = c + Zjl^r,-, + a, 
where 
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Charts 2 and 3 
After the shift to a higher deficit policy, bonds seemed to explain 
at least as much of inflation's changes as money did... 
Percentages of the Forecast Variance of the GN P Deflator Caused by 
Unexpected Changes (Innovations) in Federal Debt (Bonds) and Total Reserves (Money) 
According to Models Based on Data for 1948-66 and 1967-81 
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Sources of basic data: U.S. Department of Commerce; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
(13) 
C and A,- are 5 x 1 and 5x5 matrices of coefficients, respec-
tively, andm = lag length. The coefficients in the matrices 
C and,4, are estimated by ordinary least squares, and£AA' 
= A is estimated by the variance-covariance matrix of 
residuals. 
For the test for a change in budget policy, I divide the 
entire postwar period into two subperiods: from 1948:1 to 
1966:4, when budgets were nearly balanced, and from 
1967:1 to 1981:4, when budgets were almost constantly in 
deficit. To test whether the change in budget policy is 
statistically significant, I determine the probability that the 
residuals from the two subperiod DEBT regressions were 
drawn from the same distribution. The probabilities are 
determined for lag lengths m = 1 through 8. For all lag 
lengths except 8, the probability that the residuals were 
drawn from the same distribution is less than 5 percent (and 
for lag length 8 it is only 7 percent). Since the DEBT 
equation reflects the budget policy, this result means that 
one can state with a high degree of confidence that deficit 
policies were different in the two subperiods. 
The proposition that higher deficits lead to higher infla-
tion can be directly examined without employing other 
equations of the VARs. And the data do support it. (See 
Chart 1.) Between the two subperiods, the average annual 
growth rate of federal debt shot up from only about half a 
percent to nearly 7.5 percent. At the same time, inflation 
17 clearly increased: The average annual growth rate of the 
GNP deflator roughly tripled between the two subperiods. 
We can also easily examine one of the possibly corrobo-
rating implications of the legal restrictions theory—that the 
velocity of fiat money should grow faster when deficits are 
higher. And this too is supported by the data. The average 
annual growth rate of total reserve velocity increased be-
tween the two subperiods, from 3.1 percent in the first to 
3.9 percent in the second. 
Testing the other corroborating implication of the re-
strictions theory, that bonds should become more like 
money in the period of higher deficits, does require the use 
of all equations in the VARs. Again, if the theory is correct, 
then in the second subperiod the response of the economic 
process, especially inflation, to an increase in total federal 
debt should have changed and changed in a way to make it 
close to the response to a comparable increase in money. In 
order to examine this implication, I estimate VARs of lag 
length 3 over each subperiod and then study the effects of 
money and bonds on inflation from two different perspec-
tives. 
Charts 2 and 3 show that bonds did indeed become more 
like money in their contribution to the forecast variance of 
the GNP deflator. The charts show cumulated parts of the 
decomposition of variance of the GNP deflator according to 
the VARs estimated over each subperiod. The parts are the 
proportions of the forecast variance in the GNP deflator 
which are attributable to innovations in bonds and money 
(DEBT and TR). Loosely speaking, the charts show how 
much of the parts of the GNP deflator which could not be 
predicted ahead is due to DEBT and TR being different 
from expected. In the first subperiod, for forecasts of ten 
quarters and more ahead, TR accounted for about 25 per-
cent of the forecast variance of the GNP deflator, while 
DEBT accounted for almost none (Chart 2). However, for 
those forecasts in the second subperiod—when deficits and 
inflation both increased—TR and DEBT accounted for sim-
ilar percentages of the GNP deflator's forecast variance, 
with DEBT actually accounting for slightly more than TR 
(Chart 3). 
Charts 4 and 5 illustrate a similar result for the response 
over time of the GNP deflator to standardized shocks in 
bonds and money, according to the VARs estimated over 
each subperiod. In the first subperiod, the two shocks 
produced quite different reactions in the deflator: an unex-
pected increase in DEBT was correlated with a decline in 
the deflator from its expected level for about eight quarters, 
followed by increases thereafter; an unexpected increase in 
Charts 4 and 5 
.. .and bonds' impact on inflation overtime 
closely resembled money's. 
Responses of the GNP Deflator to Unexpected Increases 
in Federal Debt (Bonds) and Total Reserves (Money)* 





Chart 4 1948-66 Model 
0 4 8 12 16 20 
Quarters After I ncrease in Bonds or Money 
Chart 5 1967-81 Model 
0 4 8 12 16 20 
Quarters After Increase in Bonds or Money 
*The response of the G N P deflator to standardized positive shocks 
in DEBT and TR is measured in terms of the standard error of the 
forecast of GNPD. 
Sources of basic data: U.S. Department of Commerce; 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
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TR was correlated with an immediate and sustained in-
crease in the deflator (Chart 4). In the second, higher deficit 
subperiod, though, the dynamic responses of the deflator to 
positive shocks in DEBT and TR were very similar: after 
both shocks, the deflator increased almost immediately, the 
effect grew for two or three years, and then it dissipated 
(Chart 5). 
Summary 
Theory suggests that deficits matter for inflation if deficits is 
interpreted to mean deficit policy. A persistently higher 
deficit policy can be financed in an economy with valued 
fiat debt, money and privately held unbacked bonds. In 
such an economy, deficits determine the growth of total fiat 
debt. If the demands for the two types of debt are separate, 
then persistently higher deficits lead to higher inflation 
through necessary monetary accommodation and crowding 
out. 
Separateness of demands for the two types of debt is not 
natural. Government restrictions on the use of bonds cause 
them to be imperfect substitutes for money. Larger deficits 
increase interest rates, and, thus, private incentives to cir-
cumvent the restrictions. As the private sector breaks down 
the restrictions, bonds become easier to use in transactions, 
so more inflation results from the same monetary and 
budget policies. 
Empirical evidence supports the proposition that higher 
deficit policies increase inflation. Studies of many coun-
tries document the inflationary effects of deficit policies, 
including my study of the United States. The evidence for 
this country may not yet be as persuasive as that for others 
because of the minimal number and size of budget policy 
changes that have occurred. Unfortunately, we may have 
another and a larger change to investigate if current budget 
projections are realized. 
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